The 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act dramatically altered the economic incentive to bear children out-of-wedlock for economically disadvantaged women or couples most likely to avail themselves of welfare programs. We use data from vital statistics and a difference-in-differences research design to investigate whether state and federal welfare reform in the 1990s reduced rates of non-marital childbearing among women aged 19 to 39 at highest risk of welfare use, relative to women at lower risk. We find little consistent evidence for an effect of welfare reform on non-marital childbearing. This finding is similar to the literature that found little or mixed evidence for an effect of AFDC benefits. If anything, federal welfare reform has been associated with a small positive effect of two to three percent for white and black women ages 19 to 39.
concludes that researchers generally agree that welfare benefits influence fertility, he regards the evidence to be too weak to support definitive policy recommendations. Moreover, studies of the AFDC program may not provide evidence relevant to PRWORA because of the relatively small variation in welfare policy that the studies of the AFDC program examined. Recent welfare reform represents a striking change from past policy, and thus provides a sharper test of the effects of public assistance, and economic incentives more generally, on non-marital fertility.
Several studies have examined the effect of recent welfare reform on fertility and Grogger et al. (2002) provide a thorough review of this literature. These authors review the findings from both experimental and non-experimental studies. In regard to experimental studies, Grogger et al. (2002) conclude that aspects of recent reforms such as family caps, time-limited benefits, and mandatory work requirements had relatively little effect on births. Surprisingly, approximately half of the experimental studies report a positive association between welfare reform and fertility, which is the opposite of what theory predicts. Moreover, only three of the 18 studies reviewed found statistically significant effects: mandatory work requirements were associated with a 41 percent decrease in fertility in one (Columbus, Ohio demonstration) of the 12 studies of this policy; family cap was associated with an approximately 10 percent decrease in fertility in New Jersey, which was one of two studies; and of the four studies that focus on a combination of policies (e.g., time limits, financial sanctions, work requirements), there was only one that found that these policies reduce fertility, and in this case only among minors.
In addition to the experimental studies, several non-experimental analyses estimate the effects of welfare reform on fertility. Horvath and Peters (2000) studied the effect of the family cap, as well as other AFDC waiver provisions on the non-marital birth ratio, and report that family cap provisions decrease fertility of (all) women age 20 to 49.
2 However, other waiver provisions, such as time-limited benefits and work requirements that are prominent components of PRWORA, did not have a consistent effect on the non-marital birth ratio, even though these policies embody stronger financial incentives than family cap provisions. In contrast, Dyer and Fairlie (2001) , Kearney (2002) , and Levine (2002) find no effects of family caps on non-marital fertility. Kearney (2002) and Levine (2002) report that higher AFDC benefits are associated with significant increases in non-marital fertility, consistent with the conclusion reached by Moffitt (1998) . Kearney (2002) also studied the effect of several other aspects of welfare reform on fertility such as exemptions from work requirements and time-limited benefits. For these policies, Kearney (2002) finds no statistically significant association. 3 2 Kearney (2002) criticizes Horvath and Peters (2000) for using the birth ratio as a dependent variable because it confounds marriage and fertility responses. Kearney (2002) also notes that the estimates reported in Horvath and Peters (2000) are quite large, perhaps implausibly so, particularly since the sample is not limited to women who are most at risk of welfare receipt. 3 Kearney's study is the most similar to ours, but there are some notable differences. Both studies use vital statistics to construct counts of births by period, state and demographic group. To construct the number of births, Kearney uses individual months as the period, and the following demographic characteristics: marital status, education, and race. We use six month periods and the same demographic characteristics with the addition of individual year of age. Kearney controls for time effects using state-specific linear trends. We control for time using state-specific quadratic trends and statistical tests reject the linear specification in our data. We allow for the effect of population to differ by state and age (19 to 29 v 30 to 39), whereas Kearney constrains the effect to be equal across states. Statistical tests reject this constraint in our data. The two studies also differ on how welfare policy is specified. For example, we believe it is not useful to include both a dummy variable indicating that federal welfare reform (TANF) was implemented and a dummy variable indicating whether a state had time-limited benefits because the vast majority of states implemented time-limited benefits at the same time as TANF. We use an explicit difference-indifferences research design to investigate the effect of policies on fertility. Kearney does something similar but only with a sample of higher order births. She obtains separate estimates by groups more and less likely to be affected by welfare reform, but does not calculate the difference-in-differences estimates. Finally, we construct standard errors under the assumption that there is clustering at the state level. Kearney assumes clustering at the state-year level. We believe the evidence provided by Bertrand et al. (2002) strongly suggests clustering at the state level.
Two other studies are relevant to our analysis. Schoeni and Blank (2000) examine the effect of AFDC waivers and TANF on female headship and find that recent welfare reforms reduced female headship among less-educated women by two percentage points, or approximately eight percent. Kaushal and Kaestner (2001) investigate whether time limits and family cap provisions affected birth rates among unmarried women. They find that time limits reduced by 18 to 47 percent the probability that a lesseducated woman will have a non-marital birth, but the estimates are not always statistically significant.
To summarize, the literature provides some evidence that fertility is sensitive to changes in AFDC generosity, but evidence from the larger literature on whether the fertility of poor women responds to financial incentives is inconclusive. Further, recent welfare reform has produced unprecedented and dramatic shifts in the incentives for non-marital childbearing. The most credible estimates of the effect on fertility of the AFDC program, by contrast, examined the relatively small changes over time in benefit levels within states. 4 Thus, little is known about the effect of current welfare reform efforts on nonmarital fertility, and this circumstance underscores the value of the analysis we present below.
Theoretical Considerations
A major goal of welfare reform was to change incentives in the welfare system thought to encourage behaviors that make welfare receipt more likely. The "old" welfare program (AFDC) provided an openended entitlement to cash assistance primarily for unmarried women with children. Therefore, it created an incentive to have a non-marital birth, and as critics often pointed out, the incentive is strengthened as cash assistance becomes more generous.
5 Changes in federal and state welfare policy that have made welfare receipt temporary (i.e. time-limited benefits), that withhold cash assistance for increases in family size (i.e., family caps), and that require recipients to work, eliminated the entitlement in the AFDC program to long-term income support for unmarried women with children. In short, welfare reform has lessened the lifetime economic value of public cash assistance and has increased the (expected) cost of raising children for low-income, single parents, especially those who would like to provide full-time care at home for their pre-school aged children.
6 Consequently, potential recipients may be discouraged from enrolling in or staying on welfare and may begin to make choices that would improve their abilities for self-support. Specifically, women may avoid non-marital childbearing by either reducing fertility or increasing marriage.
One criticism of this simple model is that there is relatively little empirical evidence that more generous cash assistance is associated with more non-marital fertility (Moffitt 1998) . In response to this criticism, Murray (1993) suggested that the availability of cash assistance has lagged effects that work though changes in societal values. According to Murray (1993) , the availability of cash assistance resulted in an increase in non-marital births, which in turn, reduced the stigma associated with nonmarital fertility, leading to further increases in non-marital birth. Murray (1993) appeals to this argument to explain differences in non-marital birth rates between whites and blacks in the United States. Nechyba (2001) presents a more complete analysis of Murray's argument. Importantly, he shows that a decrease in program generosity such as that occurring under recent state and federal reforms will not necessarily result in a decrease in non-marital fertility because once the behavior has become socially accepted and commonplace, the financial incentives that initially caused an increase in non-marital births will no longer be needed to sustain it. 4 It is surprising that analysts are able to measure precisely the effect of AFDC benefits on fertility since nearly all (e.g., 98 %) of the variation in benefits is explained by state and year effects. 5 See for example, Becker (1981) , Becker and Lewis (1973) , Michael and Willis (1975) , the review by Montgomery and Trussell (1986) , and Grogger et al. (2002) . 6 Not all aspects of recent reform have made participation less attractive. For example, several states have raised earnings disregards that allow those on welfare to earn while receiving welfare benefits, and most have expanded subsidies for services such as child care that complement work. On average, however, welfare reform has lessened the economic benefit of the welfare program for the average single mother, and markedly for single mothers with pre-school aged children who would like to care for children full time.
To summarize, the standard economic model predicts that welfare reform, which makes the cash assistance program less attractive, will reduce non-marital birth through a reduction in fertility and/or an increase in marriage. However, to date, empirical evidence has not consistently supported this prediction. More sophisticated models of behavior that incorporate stigma and its determinants have more ambiguous predictions, which include a scenario where welfare reform would have little effect on non-marital fertility. The theoretical ambiguity as to the effect of welfare reform on non-marital fertility raises the importance of empirical analyses of the issue. Ultimately, the assessment of the efficacy of welfare reform as a means to reduce non-marital fertility will be determined by the empirical evidence.
Research Design and Statistical Methods
As just described, the question motivating our empirical analysis is the following. Did recent state and federal welfare reform reduce non-marital fertility? To examine this question, we use a pre-and post-test with comparison group research design, which is often referred to as a difference-in-differences (DD) approach. 7 The pre-and post-test periods correspond to pre-and post-welfare reform. We define target and comparison groups on the basis of mother's education and marital status. We define two target groups: unmarried women with less than 12 years of education and unmarried women with 12 years of education. Similarly, we define two comparison groups: married women with less than 12 years of education and unmarried women with 13 to 15 years of education. Education and marital status are important predictors of welfare use (see Table 1 ). Unmarried, less-educated women have quite high rates of welfare receipt and are likely to be affected by welfare reform; married, less-educated women and unmarried women with more than a high school degree have lower rates of welfare receipt and are less likely to be affected. We provide further evidence below on the adequacy of these definitions. A strength of the pre-and post-test with comparison group research design is the focus on the populations most affected by policy changes. where ln N_OWB ijt is the natural logarithm of the number of births for women in demographic group i, state j, age k, and year t. Demographic groups (i) are defined on the basis of marital status, race/ethnicity, and education. So an example of a unit of observation would be unmarried, non-Hispanic 7 Technically, we are estimating a difference-in-difference-in-differences (DDD) model since we are using crossstate variation in addition to the pre-and post-period. 8 Moffitt (1998) presents original analyses that illustrate the importance of examining the population most affected by welfare reform, namely low-income or less-educated women. We also use within-state variation in welfare policy, an approach advocated by Moffitt (1998) . 9 We also estimated all models using the number of births instead of the natural logarithm of the number of births. Results from this alternative specification are presented in the appendix. The results do not differ qualitatively from those presented in the text. white women age 25 with a high school degree in California in 1998. Equation (1) nine-month lag so as to reflect the political climate at the time of conception. In order to obtain a closer match of policy environment to conception date, we divided years into two six-month periods. So there are two observations per year for each demographic group representing the (log) number of births for women in demographic group i in state j in the first six months and second six months of each year. We assigned the policy variable in effect nine months prior to the first of the year for births in the first six months of the year, and nine months prior to July 1 for births in the second six months of the year. We also obtained estimates using policy variables in effect six and 12 months prior to the period and results were qualitatively the same. Finally, equation (1) includes race-specific estimates of the logarithm of the population of women (ln POP) of age k in state j and year t. We control for population on the right hand side instead of constructing fertility rates (births/population) because population is not measured at the same level of detail as the dependent variable. Specifically, population estimates are available by year, state, age and race, but not by education and marital status within these cells. To further address this limitation, we allow the effect of ln POP to differ by state and age (19 to 29 v. 30 to 39). Our rationale for this specification is that it allows for a different distribution of population by education and marital status by state and age. Statistical tests reject a more parsimonious specification.
We obtain separate estimates of equation (1) by race/ethnicity using weighted least squares, where the weights are the population in each state, year, age and race cell. We also adjust standard errors for clustering within state (Bertrand et al. 2002) .
To characterize the policy environment, we focus on a few key aspects of state and federal welfare reform: time-limited benefits, family cap provisions, exemptions from work requirements, and sanctions for non-compliance (Grogger et al. 2002) . In some models, we also use a characterization of welfare policy that is common in the literature and include dummy variables for whether a state had implemented an AFDC waiver or TANF. All models include the real value of the maximum AFDC/TANF (cash) assistance for a family of three with no other income in that state and year. We discuss the policy variables in greater detail below, but we note that because many of the policies were implemented during a relatively short interval, particularly TANF, we opted to control for time effects using state-specific, quadratic trends instead of year dummy variables.
10
The advantage of this specification is that it allows for separate state trends, which statistical tests revealed to be significant.
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The disadvantage is that it is somewhat restrictive in that it allows only for a quadratic trend. However, the relatively short period of time under investigation mitigates this problem. In addition, the DD analysis is intended to control for any unmeasured state-specific effects.
We estimate equation (1) using two samples: women in the target group and women in the comparison group. We also obtain DD estimates by comparing (i.e., taking the difference between) estimates of the parameter ( 1 α ) for these two samples. We expect estimates associated with the treatment 10 TANF will be highly correlated with year dummy variables, which will make it difficult to precisely estimate effects. To assess the correlation between the policy variables and other controls, we estimated regressions where the dependent variable was the policy and the independent variables were the other control variables in the model. When the model included year effects, the R-square statistic was always higher than when the model included statespecific trends. The strongest correlation was between the real value of benefits and the other control variables; in this case the R-square was over 0.98. The R-square for the regression where TANF was dependent variable was 0.95. 11 Estimates from models that include year dummy variables are in the appendix. group to be more negative (less positive) than those associated with the comparison group because welfare reform should reduce fertility more among those more likely to be affected. We obtain DD estimates by pooling the data and allowing all coefficients to differ by whether or not a woman is in the target or comparison group. This is the least restrictive specification of the DD model and specification tests rejected the more restrictive models.
The difference-in-differences (DD) procedure is intended to isolate the effect of welfare reform from other determinants of out-of-wedlock birth that vary over time, across states, and over time within states. Most importantly, the DD approach potentially solves the difficult problem of controlling for unmeasured time-varying state effects (Moffitt 1998) . It does so by employing a within-state control or comparison group. The "treatment" group consists of women most likely affected by changes in welfare policy. The comparison group consists of women unlikely to be affected by changes in welfare policy. Under the assumption that members of the treatment and comparison groups are affected equally by unmeasured determinants of fertility that vary over time within a state, the DD procedure yields estimates of the causal effect of welfare reform. We also include in equation (1) state-specific (quadratic) time trends, and several time-varying state-specific variables, to help further control for time-varying, statespecific effects that may confound estimates of interest. At a minimum, the difference-in-differences procedure allows us to assess whether the association between welfare policy and fertility is specific to groups affected by such policy, or instead, is similar to that for groups relatively unaffected by welfare policy.
Three potential problems that weaken the causal interpretation of DD estimates merit comment. First, we have defined target and comparison groups on the basis of marital status. This is problematic if welfare reform affects marriage, as suggested by the standard economic model. However, there is little empirical support for this hypothesis (Grogger et al. 2002) . Nonetheless, if marriage is also affected by welfare reform and married persons are used as a comparison group, then the effect of welfare reform on fertility will be a combination of a behavioral response-changes in fertility behavior-and a compositional effect-changes in the pool of married and unmarried women. Since both are effects of welfare reform, this problem is partly a matter of interpretation. However, the compositional effect predicted by economic theory should lead both first-differences and difference-in-differences to exaggerate the impact of welfare reform on fertility. For example, suppose welfare reform has no effect on fertility but induces some childbearing women to marry. The effect will be to lower non-marital births and raise marital births. Therefore, changes in fertility among the unmarried (first differences), and comparisons of changes in non-marital to marital births (difference in differences) will exaggerate the impact of welfare reform on fertility. The measured change is more severe (twice as large) in the difference-in-differences than in the first differences since there is, in effect, a double counting of the reduction in non-marital births when one subtracts the (positive) change in marital births created by marriage.
To address this potential compositional bias created by our use of marital status to form treatment and comparison groups, we take a second approach to evaluate the fertility response to welfare reform. We estimate a set of models for a pooled sample of married and unmarried women, and use only educational attainment to define target and comparison groups. In this case, the target group consists of women with less than a high school degree, and the comparison group is women with more than a high school degree (13 to 15 years of education). Changes in the fertility of the less-educated group associated with welfare reform will reflect a purely behavioral response because population composition is unlikely to be affected by welfare reform. A disadvantage of this alternative approach is that fewer women in the target group are likely to be affected by changes in welfare policy, thereby muting the effect of welfare reform.
The second potential problem is that the two groups only approximate true treatment and control groups. Ideally, the entire treatment group would be at risk of going on public assistance and the entire control group would not be at risk. Obviously, none of our treatment and control groups meet this standard. We investigate the likely extent of this "contamination" problem using data from the 1994 Current Population Survey. Table 1 presents mean public assistance receipt in 1993 by education and marital status for women with children (i.e., mothers). The figures in the table clearly show that education and marital status are strongly correlated with public assistance receipt, and marital status has a particularly large effect, reflecting the eligibility criteria for welfare. For example, approximately 59 percent of less-educated (<12 years) unmarried mothers received public assistance in 1993 (i.e., the year prior to the interview) compared to only 11 percent of less-educated married mothers. These figures illustrate that less-educated, unmarried women are a particularly relevant group for the study of the effect of welfare reform. Education is also highly correlated with welfare receipt. In sum, while the figures in Table 1 demonstrate that using educational attainment and marriage to define treatment and control groups is reasonable, the classification error that results (i.e., the control group is, in fact, at some risk of welfare use) will lead to a downward bias in the DD estimates of the effect of welfare reform.
12 Estimates in Table 1 also show that unmarried women with 13 to 15 years of education have rates of welfare use similar to those of unmarried women with 12 years of education, particularly for the non-Black sample. Thus, the former group is not a useful comparison group for the latter.
The final potential problem with the DD procedure is whether the comparison groups are valid. The answer to this question depends on whether in the absence of welfare reform, unmeasured statespecific time variation in fertility is the same for the target and comparison groups. While there is no definitive answer to this question, one crude way to assess the adequacy of the comparison group is to examine mean birth rates for the target and comparison groups to see if they are similar. Figures 2, 3 and 4 present mean birth rates for the target and comparison groups of our three race/ethnic samples. For non-Hispanic white women (Figure 2 ), birth rates for those with fewer than 12 years of education are relatively similar, but as education increases the birth rates become more disparate. Figure 2 suggests that based on similarity of mean birth rates, married women with fewer than 12 years of education are a reasonable comparison group for unmarried women with fewer than 12 years of education. Figure 3 presents mean birth rates for non-Hispanic black women. In this case, three of the four groups have similar birth rates with only the rate for unmarried women with 13 to 15 years of education differing. So based on Figure 3 , married women with fewer than 12 years of education are a reasonable comparison group for unmarried women with 12 or fewer years of education. Birth rates in Figure 4 for Hispanic women show a similar pattern as that for non-Hispanic white women. Here too, the data suggest that married women with fewer than 12 years of education are a reasonable comparison group for unmarried women with fewer than 12 years of education. 13 An alternative way to assess the adequacy of the comparison groups is to implement the DD procedure in a period where no policy change has taken place by constructing a pseudo policy that arbitrarily divides calendar time into a before-and after-period. If the comparison group is adequate, DD estimates of the effect of this pseudo-policy should be zero. In our case, the period between 1990 and 1993 is one in which very little state welfare reform has taken place and there was as yet no federal reform. Accordingly, we divide the period into two: 1990-1 and 1992-3, treating 1992-3 as the after period. We then obtain DD estimates for the three race/ethnic groups that are the focus of this paper. The results indicate that in all but one case, DD estimates are small (i.e., close to zero) and not statistically significant. The only DD estimate that was non-zero and statistically significant was for the sample of Hispanic women when unmarried women with between 13 to 15 years of education was used as a comparison group for unmarried women with fewer than 12 years of education. Overall, the data support for the validity of our comparison groups and the assumptions underlying our research design. 12 However, the figures in this table likely understate the differences in public assistance use by education and marital status due to underreporting of public assistance receipt in the March CPS. See, for example, Meyer and Sullivan, 2003; National Research Council 1995, Appendix B. 13 The use of log birth rates as a dependent variable makes pre-and post-policy comparisons relative. Thus, the absolute differences in means are not problematic. Of course, this "solves" the problem only if relative comparisons are appropriate.
Data
The primary data for the analysis are individual birth records submitted by hospitals to state vital registration offices. All 50 states and the District of Columbia collect detailed information on individual births and report them to the National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS). We use the Detailed Natality Files made available by NCHS for the years 1990 to 1999.
14 Information for each birth includes date of birth, and a variety of demographic characteristics of the mother such as state of residence, age, race, parity, education and marital status. We limit the sample to women between the ages of 19 and 39. 15 We omit teens from the analysis because there is little variation in educational attainment or marital status and, as a result, these characteristics do not effectively sort teenagers into target and comparison groups.
Although the NCHS Natality Files are relatively complete, some states do not collect all the necessary demographic data in each year. In 1990 and 1991, New York State and Washington State did not collect complete information on education status. New Hampshire did not collect information on Hispanic origin in 1990-1992, and Oklahoma did not collect such information in 1990. So these states were dropped in these years. For other states and other years, the data are relatively complete. Information on age and race and marital status is nearly always (>99%) recorded (i.e., not imputed) and fewer than five percent of the cases are missing other information such as Hispanic origin and education in the vast majority of states. Perhaps the most problematic variable is marital status, which affects counts of non-marital births (Ventura and Bachrach 2000) . In Michigan and Texas, reporting procedures resulted in severe undercounts of non-marital births from 1990 to 1992. Reporting changes in California and New York City in 1995 and 1997, respectively, generated significant changes in the counts of nonmarital births. Similar, though less severe problems occurred in Nevada and Connecticut in the late 1990s. 16 In light of these classification problems, we re-estimated some models in which we used marital status to stratify the sample but omitted large states (CA, NY, MI, and TX) that changed data collection procedures. The results from these models were quite similar to those reported below. Therefore, we do not present these results, but they are available upon request.
The dependent variable in the analysis is the natural logarithm of the count of births in each category, defined by year, state of mother's residence, mother's age, mother's race/ethnicity, mother's martial status, and mother's education. We limited the analysis to states and years that had at least 60 persons in a year, state, age, and race/ethnicity cell. This largely eliminated the problem associated with empty cells (i.e., zero births).
17 Alternative estimates were obtained using the number of births and were qualitatively the same as those reported below. We include some of these estimates in the appendix for review. The regression models include the logarithm of population as a control. This specification is similar to using the logarithm of the birth rate as the dependent variable, but the effect of the logarithm of population is not constrained to equal one. In either case, it is necessary to obtain estimates of the population of women in each demographic group, but no data source is truly adequate for this purpose. The Census Bureau provides population estimates by year, state, sex, single year of age, and race, but not by education and marital status. Obviously, there will be some measurement error as a result of using the 14 Data from the year 2000 cannot be used because there are no population estimates for this year that are consistent with the population estimates for 1990 to 1999. The Census bureau has not produced a consistent set of historical population estimates that use the 2000 Census. 15 We also re-estimated all models presented below using a sample of women between the ages of 19 and 29. Results, contained in the appendix, were similar to those presented below. 16 In California and New York, marital status of the mother is inferred from a paternity acknowledgment or missing father's name on the birth certificate. Prior to 1996, California, Connecticut, Nevada, and New York City depended on a comparison of the mother's and father's name. In 1997, California and Nevada changed from inference to a direct question and New York City changed to an inferential system comparable to upstate New York. Finally, Connecticut added a direct question in mid-1998. A review by NCHS of Connecticut's birth data for 1998 indicated the proportion of births to unmarried women was somewhat higher under the inferential method than in the last six months when marital status was based on a direct question. 17 By restricting the sample to cells with at least 60 persons, fewer than 0.1 percent of the observation were deleted because of zero births.
Census data since the population controls do not correspond perfectly to exposure to the risk of the event measured by the dependent variable.
In order to examine whether or not this measurement error is important, we used the Current Population Survey to obtain population estimates for the more narrowly defined subpopulations, and reestimated the model using these population controls. We limited this analysis to large states for which population estimates derived from the CPS are most reliable.
18
The results strongly indicated that measurement error resulting from the use of the Census population estimates has little effect on our analysis: estimates (not shown, but available from the authors) obtained using the more detailed CPS population estimates were very similar to those obtained using the coarser Census population estimates.
The data on welfare policies are drawn from Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation of the Department of Health and Human Services, as well as from the Urban Institute (www.urban.org/content/Research/NewFederalism/Data/StateDatabase/StateDatabase.htm) and the State Documentation Project of the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities (see www.cbpp.org and www.spdp.org/tanf.htm ) We focus on a few key aspects of state and federal welfare reform-timelimited benefits, family cap provisions, exemptions from work requirements, and sanctions for noncompliance-and characterize the policies in two ways. We follow the earlier literature and estimate models that include dummy variables for whether a state had implemented an AFDC waiver or TANF. We also estimate models that include each of the four policies separately. In both cases we include the real value of AFDC/TANF cash benefits. All policies are measured at the time of implementation and merged to the birth certificate data with a nine-month lag from the beginning of the period in which the birth occurred. As noted above, we also estimated models using six-month and 12-month lags, but there were no qualitative difference in results. 
Results
We begin by reviewing time trends in aggregate data. Rates of childbearing among unmarried women by race and ethnicity are displayed in Figure 1 . There is no prominent break in any of the series following 1996, the year of passage of PRWORA. Rates of non-marital fertility fell steadily for black women, rose slightly among white women, and were essentially unchanged for Hispanic women over the 1990s. Figures 2 through 4 present fertility rates for married and unmarried women with 12 or fewer years of education for non-Hispanic whites, non-Hispanic blacks, and Hispanics, respectively. Unmarried women with little education are the populations most likely to be affected by welfare reform. Rates of nonmarital fertility among less-educated white women generally increased over the 1990s, while rates of martial fertility declined in the first half of the 1990s and increased in the second half (Figure 2) . Figure 3 tells a similar story for less-educated black women, except that rates of non-marital fertility actually increased slightly in the late 1990s, after declining in the early part of the decade. The increase at the end of the 1990s could be the result of delayed fertility among less-educated black women, since rates of teen childbearing among black women have been on the decline since the early 1990s. Among Hispanic women we observe a rise in non-marital childbearing to about 1994, after which rates remain relatively flat (Figure 4) . Table 2 presents regression estimates of the effect of welfare reform on the fertility of nonHispanic, white women. Each of the first four columns of the table corresponds to a different sample. The first two columns show estimates for the two groups we consider most likely to be affected by changes in welfare policy, as these groups have relatively high rates of welfare use. Columns three and four show estimates for two comparison groups-samples of women less likely to be significantly affected by changes in welfare policy. We expect the effects of welfare reform to be larger (i.e., more 18 Population estimates can be obtained using the weights provided by the CPS. For small states, population estimates contain a significant amount of error because of the small samples and the detailed demographic breakdowns we are using. 19 In addition, we estimated models using the number of months since AFDC waiver or TANF were implemented. These results were similar to those reported in the text. negative) in the first two columns than in columns three and four. The last three columns show the DD estimates.
Within each column, we present estimates from two separate regression models that differ by the characterization of welfare policy. The top panel (row one) includes two dummy variables denoting AFDC waivers and TANF. The bottom panel (row two) includes indicator variables of whether or not a state had the following: time-limited benefits; family cap provisions; financial sanctions for first time non-compliance and full sanctions for repeat non-compliance; and exempts from work requirements only women with children under six-months of age. In both models, the real value of AFDC/TANF cash benefits is included.
Estimates in the top panel of Table 2 indicate that, in general, AFDC waivers and TANF were associated with an increase of between two and five percent in fertility for all four demographic groups. Estimates of the effect of TANF implementation on the fertility of unmarried women with 12 or fewer years of education are statistically significant. Difference-in-differences estimates are shown in the last three columns and all of the estimates of the effect of AFDC waivers and TANF are statistically insignificant and small in magnitude. The largest estimate suggests that TANF was associated with a 2.6 percent increase in fertility for unmarried women with less than 12 years of education. Estimates of the effect of cash assistance benefit levels in the first four columns are mixed and imprecisely estimated, which reflects the lack of independent variation in this variable, as over 99 percent of the variation in this variable is accounted for by the other right hand side covariates (e.g., state-specific quadratic trends). Three of the four estimates are positive and one is statistically significant and indicates that a $10 increase in monthly benefits, which is the typical year to year variation representing approximately a four percent change, is associated with a 1.4 percent increase in fertility. DD estimates of the effect of AFDC/TANF benefits are listed in the last three columns, and all are statistically insignificant. Appendix Tables 1 and  2 present estimates from two alternative models: models in Appendix Table 1 include year dummy variables instead of state-specific trends, and models in Appendix Table 2 use the number of births as the dependent variable. Results are similar to those just discussed.
Row two presents the estimates of the effect of individual components of welfare reform. These estimates indicate that time-limited benefits, family cap provisions, financial sanctions, and inclusive work requirements were not significantly associated with the fertility of non-Hispanic, white women. Almost all of the estimates in the first four columns are statistically insignificant and most are smallindicating effects of less than two percent. Most DD estimates are also statistically insignificant and small-the largest effect suggests that time-limited benefits was associated with an increase in fertility of 3.8 percent for unmarried women with fewer than 12 years of education.
As we noted earlier, defining target and comparison groups on the basis of marital status is potentially problematic if welfare reform affected marital status. As we discussed earlier, a positive effect of welfare reform on marriage would produce downward-biased estimates of the effects of welfare reform on fertility, Since our estimates are suggestive of a positive effect on fertility, if welfare reform increased marriage then our results understate the true (positive) effect of reform on fertility. If, on the other hand, welfare reform reduced marriage, then our results might be upward biased. However, we also noted that difference-in-differences estimates would be more greatly affected by this source of bias than first differences. Yet we do not find that difference-in-differences estimates are consistently larger than estimates based on first-differences.
Nonetheless, welfare reform may have affected marital status, in which case the estimates in Table 2 would confound the behavioral response and a compositional effect. Importantly, both effects are due to welfare reform and thus, estimates in Table 2 are of interest even if marital status is endogenous. One way to sort out the two effects is to drop marital status from the definition of target and control groups. As Table 1 reveals, there is significant variation in welfare use among women defined on the basis of education alone; among non-Hispanic white mothers with less than a high school degree, 26 percent report receiving welfare benefits in the prior year whereas only 7.1 percent of mothers with between 13 and 15 years of education report such income. Therefore, we use less educated women as the target group and more educated women as the comparison group. Table 5 presents estimates from the analysis that uses these groups.
Estimates in Table 5 pertaining to non-Hispanic, white women are quite consistent with those in Table 2 . Most of the estimates of welfare reform policy are small (< four percent) and statistically insignificant. AFDC waivers, TANF, and time-limited benefits, which is highly correlated with TANF, are generally positively related to fertility while the other measures of welfare reform are more mixed. DD estimates of TANF, and time-limited benefits, are positive and statistically significant, suggesting increases in fertility of approximately four percent. In sum, the estimates in Table 5 do not suggest that those in Table 2 are significantly affected by selection effects resulting from welfare reform's effect on marital status. Instead they confirm the results of Table 2 and suggest that state and federal welfare reform had no effect, or a small positive effect on fertility. Table 3 presents estimates of the effect of welfare reform on the fertility of non-Hispanic, black women, and has the same format as Table 2 . Estimates in columns one through four of the top panel indicate that AFDC waivers are not statistically associated with fertility and that TANF is positively and significantly associated with fertility for members of the two target groups. The two statistically significant estimates suggest that TANF is associated with a five to six percent increase in the fertility of unmarried women with 12 or fewer years of education. DD estimates of the effect of AFDC waivers are not statistically significant and small. However, DD estimates of the effect of TANF are all positive and of the same approximate magnitude-four to five percent-but only one is statistically significant. Finally, estimates in the top panel of Table 3 of the effect of cash benefits are not statistically significant and are mixed in sign. Before turning to the estimates in the bottom panel of Table 3 , we note that estimates in Appendix Tables 1 and 2 are generally consistent with those in Table 3 -TANF is associated with an increase in fertility for unmarried, non-Hispanic black women with 12 or fewer years of education.
Estimates of the effect of individual components of welfare reform are presented in the bottom panel (row two) of Table 3 . Estimates of the effect of time-limited benefits in the first four columns suggest that this policy is associated with a six to eight percent increase in the fertility of unmarried women with 12 or fewer years of education, and a nine percent increase in the fertility of married women with fewer than 12 years of education. Estimates in the first four columns of the effect of other components of welfare reform and of cash benefits are more mixed and few are statistically significant. DD estimates (last three columns) suggest that the various components of welfare reform were in general not statistically related to the fertility of non-Hispanic black women. The only statistically significant DD estimate is that pertaining to time-limited benefits when unmarried women with 13 to 15 years of education is used as a comparison group. In sum, as was the case for non-Hispanic, white women, welfare reform does not appear to be associated with reductions in the relative fertility of less-educated, unmarried non-Hispanic black women. If anything, TANF was associated with a small increase in fertility.
We also obtained estimates of the effect of welfare reform on the fertility of non-Hispanic, black women using target and comparison groups defined by education alone. These estimates are shown in Table 5 . They confirm the findings just reviewed. TANF and policies highly correlated with it such as time-limited benefits were positively associated with fertility. DD estimates in Table 5 suggest an effect of five to six percent. Estimates in Table 5 also support the argument that any effects of welfare reform on marriage did not bias estimates in Table 3 .
The third population we studied was Hispanic women, who may be of any race. Estimates of the effect of welfare reform on the fertility of this group of women are presented in Table 4 . As noted, the reporting of marital status has been inconsistent in some states. We expected Hispanics to be particularly affected by problems with marital status reporting because of the large concentrations of Hispanics in states with reporting inconsistencies such as California, Texas and New York. Moreover, the way that California and New York altered reporting procedures is most likely to have affected Hispanics (Ventura and Bachrach 2000) . In light of this concern, we re-estimated all models excluding states with known reporting problems: California and New York in all years, and Michigan and Texas prior to 1993. The estimates from these models were very similar to those reported in Table 4 . Therefore, we do not report them, but they are available from authors.
Estimates in the top panel of Table 4 indicate a relatively large negative association between AFDC waivers and the fertility of low-educated, unmarried women (columns one and two). Estimates indicate that AFDC waivers were associated with a statistically significant, eight to nine percent decrease in the fertility of these two groups. A similar effect is found for unmarried women with between 13 and 15 years of education. In contrast, AFDC waivers are associated with an increase in the fertility of loweducated married Hispanic women. Consistent with this pattern, DD estimates suggest very different effects depending on which comparison group is used. If the estimates in column three are used, the DD estimates are small, positive and not statistically significant. If the estimates in column four are used, the DD estimates are large and negative, but still not statistically significant. One possible explanation for this finding is the geographic concentration of Hispanics, which suggests that only a few states that had AFDC waivers and large Hispanic concentrations may be driving this result-notably California. Therefore, we re-estimated the model dropping California. In this case, the DD estimates of the effect of AFDC remained negative and significant although a bit smaller in magnitude-approximately seven percent. Finally, estimates of the effect of AFDC waivers in Table 5 are inconsistent with those in Table  4 . When only education status is used to define target and comparison groups, estimates of the effect of AFDC waivers are small and not statistically significant. Estimates of the effect of TANF in Table 4 are in all but one case positive, and all are small and not statistically significant.
The bottom panel of Table 4 shows estimates of the effect of individual components of welfare reform. In general, the estimates are mixed in sign and not statistically significant. The one exception is family cap provisions. In this case, estimates indicate that family cap provisions are associated with an increase in fertility of low-educated, unmarried Hispanic women. In fact, DD estimates suggest an increase of six to nine percent. However, estimates in Table 5 , which were obtained without using marital status to define target and comparison groups, indicate that family cap provisions were unrelated to the fertility of Hispanic women. Our reading of this evidence, and the evidence presented in Appendix Tables 1 and 2, is that it indicates that time-limited benefits and other aspects of welfare reform were not statistically associated with the fertility of Hispanic women.
Conclusions
Non-marital births are considered among the most important avenues to welfare dependence. Indeed, eligibility for federal cash assistance is limited to families with children, and eligibility for families headed by a married couple has been quite restricted. Consequently, the welfare caseload consists predominantly of unmarried women and their children, and unmarried women have high rates of welfare receipt. This fact, along with the relatively poor outcomes of children from single-parent families, motivated the authors of the 1996 welfare reform law (PRWORA). Changes in welfare policy that made cash assistance temporary and participation in the program more onerous were, in part, intended to discourage couples from having non-marital births. We have investigated whether PRWORA, and earlier state welfare "waiver" reform efforts from which PRWORA drew many of its provisions, were associated with a reduction in non-marital fertility in the 1990s. The evidence we presented suggests that welfare reform had relatively little effect on the fertility of less-educated, unmarried women. If anything, AFDC waivers were associated with a negative effect of seven to nine percent on Hispanic women's fertility, and TANF was associated with a small positive effect of between three and four percent for white and black women. However, the absence of a consistent set of findings--for example a similar effect of a given policy for women of all race/ethnic groups, and the predominance of insignificant effects-leads us to conclude that, in general, state and federal reform have not affected fertility.
The absence of a finding of a significant effect of welfare reform on non-marital fertility is consistent with earlier literature that has found little relationship between AFDC benefit levels and fertility (Moffitt 1992 ). However, more recent studies have found consistent evidence of effects, although modest in size (Kearney 2001 , Levine 2002 . 20 In comparison, our lack of a finding is surprising. Previous analyses have primarily relied upon variation in benefit levels across states and across time to identify effects of welfare on fertility. PRWORA and, sometimes, earlier state reforms represent the elimination of the entitlement to a benefit, a far more dramatic change in financial incentives than marginal or even moderate shifts in the benefit levels.
It is certainly possible that there has been an effect of welfare reform on non-marital fertility that we were unable to detect. For example, there may be strong cohort patterns in non-marital fertility; thus, exposure during the early teen years to a policy regime without a welfare entitlement might produce large behavioral changes for such "entering" cohorts but little change among older cohorts (e.g., Rindfuss 1991) . In this case, a study that focuses on the cohort of younger women who entered their childbearing years after the imposition of welfare reform might uncover more evidence of an effect. We attempted to address this issue here by limiting the sample to women between the ages of 19 and 29 and re-estimating all models, but there was no evidence of an effect of welfare reform on the fertility of this group (results in Appendix Table 3 ). Kaestner, Korenman and O'Neill (2003) also examined the effect of welfare reform on teens and found some evidence that welfare reform has decreased disadvantaged teen's nonmarital fertility. Grogger et al. (2002) also report that the Empower Demonstration reduced the fertility of minors on welfare.
Another possible explanation for our findings is that more time may be needed for couples or women to adjust fertility behavior to policy changes. The argument against this hypothesis is the evidence that welfare reform has already had a substantial effect on work effort and welfare receipt (Kaushal and Kaestner 2001; CEA 1999; Schoeni and Blank 2000; Grogger 2000) . Nonetheless, work and welfare use should be expected to respond more quickly since the actual provisions of the law (although not the rhetoric) were more clearly targeted to changing work effort and welfare dependency than to promoting marriage or reducing non-marital fertility.
Finally, our results are consistent with the predictions of Nechyba (2001) . He shows that it is possible that significant changes in welfare policy such as those studied here may have no effect on fertility. Once non-marital fertility rates reach a certain level and are common among groups not likely to be affected by welfare policy, changes in welfare policy may have little effect, and social norms or values may have a more dominant influence on behavior. 20 It is surprising that recent studies have been able to find an effect of cash benefits given that there is little independent variation in this variable. Estimates of its effect are very sensitive to how researchers control for state and year effects, as evidenced in the difference in estimates between Tables 2, 3 The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the number of children born to women in each demographic cell, which is defined by year of age, education, marital status, state, and period. Each period consists of six months. Each of the policy variables is lagged by nine months tied to the first month of the period. Each panel presents estimates from a separate regression. Regression estimates are obtained by weighted least squares where the weight is the population of women in each cell (age, state, period) . Each regression controls for: state fixed effects; a state-specific quadratic time trend; age fixed effects; log (population of women) interacted with state and age (19-29 v. 30-39; 102 effects) ; the current and one-year lag of real per-capita personal income in each state; current and oneyear lag of state unemployment rate; and a dummy variable for each half of the year. Robust (clustering on state) standard errors are in parentheses. Table 1: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the number of children born to women in each demographic cell, which is defined by year of age, education, marital status, state, and period. Each period consists of six months. Each of the policy variables is lagged by nine months tied to the first month of the period. Each panel presents estimates from a separate regression. Regression estimates are obtained by weighted least squares where the weight is the population of women in each cell (age, state, period) . Each regression controls for: state fixed effects; year fixed effects; age fixed effects; log (population of women) interacted with state and age (19-29 v. 30-39; 102 effects) ; the current and one-year lag of real per-capita personal income in each state; current and one-year lag of state unemployment rate; and a dummy variable for each half of the year. Robust (clustering on state) standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent variable is the number of children born to women in each demographic cell, which is defined by year of age, education, marital status, state, and period. Each period consists of six months. Each of the policy variables is lagged by nine months tied to the first month of the period. Each panel presents estimates from a separate regression. Regression estimates are obtained by weighted least squares where the weight is the population of women in each cell (age, state, period) . Each regression controls for: state fixed effects; a state-specific quadratic time trend; age fixed effects; log (population of women) interacted with state and age (19-29 v. 30-39; 102 effects) ; the current and one-year lag of real per-capita personal income in each state; current and one-year lag of state unemployment rate; and a dummy variable for each half of the year. Robust (clustering on state) standard errors are in parentheses. 
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